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Abstract—In cloud computing application scenarios involving
computationally weak clients, the natural need for applied
cryptography solutions requires the delegation of the most
expensive cryptography algorithms to a computationally stronger
cloud server. Group exponentiation is an important operation
used in many public-key cryptosystems and, more generally,
cryptographic protocols. Solving the problem of delegating group
exponentiation in the case of a single, possibly malicious, server,
was left open since early papers in the area. Only recently,
we have solved this problem for a large class of cyclic groups,
including those commonly used in cryptosystems proved secure
under the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.
In this paper we solve this problem for an important class
of non-cyclic groups, which includes RSA groups when the
modulus is the product of two safe primes, a common setting
in applications using RSA-based cryptosystems. We show a
delegation protocol for fixed-exponent exponentiation in such
groups, satisfying natural correctness, security, privacy and
efficiency requirements, where security holds with exponentially
small probability. In our protocol, with very limited offline
computation and server computation, a client can delegate an
exponentiation to an exponent of the same length as a group
element by only performing two exponentiations to an exponent
of much shorter length (i.e., the length of a statistical parameter).
We obtain our protocol by a non-trivial adaptation to the RSA
group of our previous protocol for cyclic groups.
Index Terms—Secure Outsourcing, Secure Delegation, Modu-
lar Exponentiations, RSA, Cryptography, Group Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
As cloud computing is effectively becoming the reference
computation paradigm for large-scale data processing, new
solutions for privately and securely sharing the processing of
client data are needed. This is especially the case in application
scenarios involving computationally weak clients (e.g., RFID
networks, Internet-of-Things, LPWA sensor networks, etc.).
In such scenarios, the natural need for applied cryptogra-
phy solutions requires the delegation of the most expensive
cryptography algorithms to a computationally stronger cloud
server. Research on similar types of problems has been ob-
served in cryptography sub-areas, like server-aided cryptog-
raphy, commodity-based cryptography, etc. In particular, in
server-aided cryptography, researchers have posed and studied
the problem of clients delegating cryptographic computations
to servers. Ideas related to this area have circulated in the
literature already many years ago (see, e.g., [10], which
introduced ‘wallets with observers’ where a third party, such
as a bank, installs hardware on a user’s computer to facilitate
its future computations).
The first formal model for delegation of cryptographic
operations was introduced in [24], where the authors especially
studied the delegation of modular exponentiation, as this
operation is a cornerstone of so many cryptographic protocols,
secure under the most typically used assumptions (e.g., the
hardness of discrete logarithm, of inverting the RSA function,
etc.). In [24], the authors considered secure delegation of
exponentiation to 2 servers, assumed to be physically sepa-
rated, of which at most one can be malicious, and to 1 server,
who is assumed to behave honestly on almost all inputs. Since
then, the problem of delegating exponentiation to a single,
arbitrarily malicious server, has remained unsolved. Here, the
challenge is to simultaneously satisfy, in addition to efficiency,
correctness and privacy requirements, a security requirement,
where it is demanded that no efficient malicious server can
convince the client of an incorrect computation result, except
with very small probability. This open problem has also been
reiterated in [29].
A. Previous results
As also mentioned in [24], a number of solutions had been
proposed, even before their paper introduced a security model,
and then broken in follow-up papers. The single-server solu-
tion from [24] assumes that the server is honest on almost all
inputs. Other solutions were proposed in more recent papers,
but these solution either only consider a semi-honest server
[12], or two non-colluding servers [11], or do not target input
privacy [18], or only achieve constant security probability (of
detecting a cheating server) [9], [29]. The schemes proposed in
[8], [27] do not satisfy our privacy requirement and the scheme
proposed in [31] does not satisfy our security requirement.
The closest result to what we present in this paper is our
previous protocol in [15] that solves the above open problem
for the delegation of fixed-base exponentiation in a large
class of cyclic groups (including groups commonly used in
cryptographic protocols secure under the discrete logarithm
assumption). Also of some interest is our delegation protocol
in [17] for arbitrary (including non-abelian) groups where an
efficient protocol with constant security probability is trans-
formed into one with exponentially small security probability,
where the transformation is more efficient than direct parallel
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repetition (but has non-constant client and offline work for
each delegated exponentiation).
In the literature there are also a few general-purpose delega-
tion protocols in different, not applicable, models. In [23] the
authors studied the problem of interactive and zero-knowledge
proofs with low-complexity verifiers. Later, [19] proposed
a protocol for securely delegating arbitrary polynomial-time
functions using garbled circuits [30] and fully homomorphic
encryption [21]. This protocol delegates functions in settings
where the client is powerful enough to run encryption and
decryption algorithms of a fully homomorphic encryption
scheme, but not enough to homomorphically evaluate a circuit
that computes decryption steps in the garbling scheme for the
function. Different protocols, not using garbled circuits, were
later proposed in [13]. These protocols delegate functions in
settings where the client is assumed to be powerful enough to
run encryption and decryption algorithms of a fully homomor-
phic encryption scheme, but not enough to homomorphically
evaluate the delegated function.
B. Our Results
We reconsider the open problem from [24] of delegating
exponentiation beyond the case of cyclic groups solved in
[15]. A natural candidate is the (non-cyclic) Z∗n group used
in RSA-based cryptosystems (starting with [28]). A natural
question is whether our previous solution in [15] can be used
or adapted to use also for non-cyclic group. We answer this
in the affirmative, in that we (1) uncover the technical gaps
in making our previous protocol for cyclic groups work for
non-cyclic groups; (2) modify the protocol to solve these
technical gaps for a class of non-cyclic groups, which include
the Z∗n group used in RSA-based cryptosystems, where n is
the product of two, same-length, safe primes (which is the
typically recommended setting for n).
Our main result is a protocol for the delegation to a single
server of fixed-exponent exponentiation in such Z∗n groups,
which satisfies the desired correctness, privacy, security and
efficiency (on client runtime, especially) requirements. This
solves the open problem of [24] for (non-cyclic) RSA groups.
In our protocol, security is satisfied with probability ex-
ponentially small in a statistical security parameter λ (which
can be set equal to, for instance, 128). The privacy and
security properties do not rely on any additional complexity
assumptions, in that they hold even if the adversary corrupting
the server is not limited to run in polynomial time. The client
delegates an exponentiation with an exponent as long as a
group element (e.g., of σ = 2048 bits), while only performing
2 exponentiations with a much smaller exponent (e.g., of
λ = 128 bits). Both the offline phase and the server in
the online phase only require 2 exponentiations with σ-bit
exponents. As in all previous work in the area, we consider a
model with an offline phase, where a client can precompute
exponentiations to random exponents, or another party can
precompute them and store them on the client’s device.
As a direct application of our result, RSA encryption (with
large exponents) can be delegated by reducing the client’s
computation by about 1 order of magnitude.
II. NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In this section we formally define delegation protocols, and
their correctness, security, privacy and efficiency requirements,
mainly building on the definitional approach from [15], in turn
based on those in [19] and [24]. We also introduce group
notations and definitions that will be used in the rest of the
paper. We start with some basic notations.
A. Basic notations
The expression y ← T denotes the probabilistic process
of randomly and independently choosing y from set T . The
expression y ← A(x1, x2, . . .) denotes the (possibly proba-
bilistic) process of running algorithm A on input x1, x2, . . .
and any necessary random coins, and obtaining y as output.
The expression (zA, zB) ← (A(x1, x2, . . .), B(y1, y2, . . .))
denotes the (possibly probabilistic) process of running an
interactive protocol between A, taking as input x1, x2, . . . and
any necessary random coins, and B, taking as input y1, y2, . . .
and any necessary random coins, where zA, zB are A and
B’s final outputs, respectively, at the end of this protocol’s
execution.
B. System scenario, entities, and protocol
We consider a system with two types of parties: clients
and servers, where a client’s computational resources are
expected to be more limited than a server’s ones, and therefore
clients are interested in delegating the computation of specific
functions to servers. In all our solutions, we consider a single
client, denoted as C, and a single server, denoted as S. We
assume that the communication link between each client and
S is private or not subject to confidentiality, integrity, or
replay attacks, and note that such attacks can be separately
addressed using known communication security techniques.
As in all previous work in the area, we consider a model
with an offline phase, where computations of the delegated
function on random inputs can be precomputed and made
somehow available to the client. This model has been jus-
tified in several ways, all appealing to different application
settings. In the presence of a trusted party (say, setting up
the client’s device), the trusted party can simply perform the
precomputed exponentiations and store them on the client’s
device. If no trusted party is available, in the presence of
a pre-processing phase where the client’s device does not
have significant computation constraints, the client can itself
perform the precomputed exponentiations and store them on
its own device.
Let σ denote the computational security parameter (i.e.,
the parameter derived from hardness considerations on the
underlying computational problem), and let λ denote the
statistical security parameter (i.e., a parameter such that events
with probability 2−λ are extremely rare). Both parameters are
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expressed in unary notation (i.e., 1σ, 1λ) and implicitly as-
sumed as inputs to all algorithms. When performing numerical
performance analysis, we use σ = 2048 and λ = 128, as these
are currently the most often recommended parameter settings
in cryptographic protocols and applications.
Let F : Dom(F ) → CoDom(F ) be a function, where
Dom(F ) denotes F ’s domain, CoDom(F ) denotes F ’s co-
domain, and desc(F ) denotes F ’s description. Assuming
desc(F ) is known to both C and S, and input x is known only
to C, we define a client-server protocol for the outsourced
computation of F in the presence of an offline phase as a
2-party, 2-phase, communication protocol between C and S,
denoted as (C(desc(F ), x), S(desc(F ))), and consisting of
the following steps:
1) pp← Offline(desc(F )),
2) (yC , yS)← (C(desc(F ), pp, x), S(desc(F ))).
As discussed above, Step 1 is executed in an offline phase,
when the input x to the function F is not yet available. Step
2 is executed in the online phase, when the input x to the
function F is available to C. At the end of both phases, C
learns yC (intended to be = F (x)) and S learns yS (usually
an empty string in this paper). In addition to parameters
1σ, 1λ, we will often omit desc(F ) for brevity of description.
Executions of outsourced computation protocols can happen
sequentially (each execution starting after the previous one
is finished), or concurrently (S runs at the same time one
execution with each one of many clients).
C. Correctness Requirement
Informally, the (natural) correctness requirement states that
if both parties follow the protocol, C obtains some output
at the end of the protocol, and this output is, with high
probability, equal to the value obtained by evaluating function
F on C’s input. A formal definition follows.
Definition 1: Let σ, λ be the security parameters, let F be
a function, and let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the
outsourced computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisfies δc-
correctness if for any x in F ’s domain, it holds that
Prob
[
out← CorrExpF(1
σ, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≥ δc,
for some δc close to 1, where experiment CorrExp is detailed
below:
CorrExpF(1
σ, 1λ)
1. pp← Offline(desc(F ))
2. (yC , yS)← (C(pp, x), S)
3. if yC = F (x) then return: 1
else return: 0
D. Security Requirement
Informally, the most basic security requirement would state
the following: if C follows the protocol, a malicious adversary
corrupting S cannot convince C to obtain, at the end of the
protocol, some output y′ different from the value y obtained
by evaluating function F on C’s input x. To define a stronger
and more realistic security requirement, we augment the adver-
sary’s power so that the adversary can even choose C’s input
x, before attempting to convince C of an incorrect output. We
also do not restrict the adversary to run in polynomial time.
A formal definition follows.
Definition 2: Let σ, λ be the security parameters, let F be
a function, and let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the
outsourced computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisfies ǫs-
security against a malicious adversary if for any algorithm A,
it holds that
Prob
[
out← SecExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≤ ǫs,
for some ǫs close to 0, where experiment SecExp is detailed
below:
SecExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ)
1. pp← Offline(desc(F ))
2. (x, aux)← A(desc(F ))
3. (y′, aux)← (C(pp, x), A(aux))
4. if y′ =⊥ or y′ = F (x) then return: 0
else return: 1.
E. Privacy Requirement
Informally, the privacy requirement should guarantee the
following: if C follows the protocol, a malicious adversary
corrupting S cannot obtain any information about C’s input x
from a protocol execution. This is formalized by extending the
indistinguishability-based approach typically used in formal
definitions for encryption schemes. That is, the adversary can
pick two inputs x0, x1, then one of these two inputs is chosen
at random and used by C in the protocol with the adversary
acting as S, and then the adversary tries to guess which input
was used by C. As for security, we do not restrict the adversary
to run in polynomial time. A formal definition follows.
Definition 3: Let σ, λ be the security parameters, let F be a
function, and let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the
outsourced computation of F . We say that (C, S) satisfies
ǫp-privacy (in the sense of indistinguishability) against a
malicious adversary if for any algorithm A, it holds that
Prob
[
out← PrivExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ) : out = 1
]
≤ ǫp,
for some ǫp close to 0, where experiment PrivExp is detailed
below:
PrivExpF,A(1
σ, 1λ)
1. pp← Offline(desc(F ))
2. (x0, x1, aux)← A(desc(F ))
3. b← {0, 1}
4. (y′, d)← (C(pp, xb), A(aux))
5. if b = d then return: 1
else return: 0.
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F. Efficiency Metrics and Requirements
Let (C, S) be a client-server protocol for the outsourced
computation of function F . We say that (C, S) has efficiency
parameters (tF , tP , tC , tS , cc,mc), if F can be computed
(without outsourcing) using tF (σ, λ) atomic operations, C can
be run in the offline phase using tP (σ, λ) atomic operations,
and in the online phase, C can be run using tC(σ, λ) atomic
operations, S can be run using tS(σ, λ) atomic operations, and
C and S exchange a total of at most mc messages, of total
length at most cc. We also define the round complexity of
(C, S) as mc, the communication complexity of (C, S) as cc,
C’s runtime complexity as tC(σ, λ), S’s runtime complexity
as tS(σ, λ) and the offline runtime complexity as tP (σ, λ).
In our runtime analysis, we only count the most expen-
sive group operations as atomic operations (e.g., group mul-
tiplications and/or exponentiation), and neglect lower-order
operations (e.g., equality testing, additions and subtractions
between group elements). While we naturally try to minimize
all these protocol efficiency metrics, our main goal is to design
protocols where
1) tC(σ, λ) << tF (σ, λ), and
2) tS(σ, λ) is not significantly larger than tF (σ, λ),
based on the underlying assumption, consistent with the state
of the art in cryptographic implementations at least for many
group types, that group multiplication requires significantly
less computing resources than group exponentiation.
G. Group notations
Let p1, p2 be primes of the same length. We say that p1, p2
are safe primes if they can be written as p1 = 2p
′
1 + 1 and
p2 = 2p
′
2 + 1, for some primes p
′
1, p
′
2. Let n = p1p2, and let
Z
∗
n denote the set of integer coprime with n. Note that the
order φ(n) of Z∗n satisfies φ(n) = (p1 − 1)(p2 − 1) = 4p
′
1p
′
2.
We consider the group (Z∗n, ·), where · denotes multiplication
modulo n, and a fixed exponent e such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1.
In this group, with parameter values n, e, we define the fixed-
exponent exponentiation function as
feExpn,e : x ∈ Z
∗
n → y ∈ Z
∗
n, such that y = x
e mod n.
Note the notation difference with the fixed-base exponentiation
function in a cyclic multiplicative group G with generator g,
defined as
fbExpg : x ∈ G→ y ∈ G, such that y = g
x.
By Lagrange’s theorem, the order of an element in Z∗n has
to divide φ(n). However, it turns out that no element in Z∗n
has order 4 (see, e.g., [16], for a detailed proof). Thus, we
have the following (a similar fact was also used in [20]):
Fact 2.1 For any x in Z∗n, the order of x is equal to 1 or 2,
or is greater than or equal to min(p′1, p
′
2).
Let σ be the computational security parameter associated
with group Z∗n, and let ℓ denote the length of the binary
representation of elements in Z∗n. Typically, in cryptographic
applications we generate parameter ℓ as about equal to σ.
The textbook algorithm to compute function feExpn,e is
the square-and-multiply algorithm, which requires up to 2ℓ
multiplications modulo n.
By desc(feExpn,e) we denote a conventional description
of the function feExpn,e that includes an encoding of the
function’s semantic meaning, and a binary encoding of values
n, e. By texp(ℓ) we denote a parameter denoting the number
of multiplications in Z∗n used to compute an exponentiation
(in Z∗n) of a group value to an arbitrary ℓ-bit exponent. We
will use values of ℓ from {σ, λ}.
III. DELEGATION OF EXPONENTIATION IN AN RSA-TYPE
GROUP
In this section we present a delegation protocol for ex-
ponentiation in an RSA-type group. First, in Section III-A
we formally state our result. Then, we provide an informal
discussion of the protocol design in Section III-B and a formal
description of the protocol in Section III-C. Finally, we detail
the proof of the protocol’s correctness, privacy, security and
efficiency properties in Section III-D and discuss a protocol
generalization in Section III-E.
A. Formal Statement of Main Result
We formally state our main result as the following
Theorem 1: Let n be an integer as defined in Section II,
let (Z∗n, ·) be the associated multiplicative group, where · is
multiplication modulo n, and let σ be its computational secu-
rity parameter. Also, let λ be a statistical security parameter.
There exists (constructively) a client-server delegation protocol
(C, S) for function feExpn,e, which satisfies
1) δc-correctness, for δc = 1;
2) ǫs-security, for ǫs = 2
−λ;
3) ǫp-privacy, for ǫp = 0;
4) efficiency with parameters (tF , tS , tP , tC , cc,mc), for
• tF = texp(σ)
• tS = 2 · texp(σ)
• tP = 2 · texp(σ) + one inversion in Z
∗
n
• tC = 2 · texp(λ) + 5 multiplications in Z
∗
n
• cc = 4 values from Z∗n
• mc = 2 messages.
In other words, protocol (C, S) for the delegation of expo-
nentiation to a fixed σ-bit exponent in Z∗n satisfies correctness
with no error probability, security with error probability 2−λ,
privacy with no error probability and requires the following
computation resources: 2 exponentiations with σ-bit exponents
from S, 2 exponentiations with λ-bit exponents plus 5 modular
multiplications from C, 2 exponentiations with σ-bit expo-
nents and one inversions in the offline phase. Furthermore,
the online phase of (C, S) only requires 2 messages and 4
group values to be exchanged.
We remark that with the currently recommended numeric
settings of parameters σ = 2048 and λ = 128, and realizing
for instance a modular exponentiation using the square-and-
multiply algorithm, in the protocol from Theorem 1, the
upper bound on modular multiplications in a non-delegated
computation is 4096. On the other hand, the upper bound
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on C’s modular multiplications in the protocol (C, S) from
Theorem 1 can be, for instance, 517, if we ask for a security
probability of 2−128.
Also remarkable are the online runtime of S and the offline
phase, whose work is only twice as much as a non-delegated
computation.
Finally, we note that the protocol’s message complexity of
2 is clearly minimal in this model.
B. Informal description of our protocol
The main challenge in coming up with delegation protocols
in our model consists of allowing a client to efficiently
verifying an exponentiation performed by a single, possibly
malicious, server. Since we work in a single-server model,
we cannot consider techniques in the multi-server model
(as in, e.g., [24]) where the client interacts with a server
to check another server’s computation. Also, note that the
efficiency constraint on the client prevents us to consider
general conversion techniques in the cryptography literature
to transform a protocol secure against a honest party into one
secure against a malicious one (e.g., [22]).
Our starting point is the protocol for efficient, private
and secure delegation of fixed-base exponentiation in cyclic
groups in [15], also reviewed in Appendix A. There, one
main idea consists of a probabilistic verification equation
which is verifiable using a much smaller number of modular
multiplications (i.e., about λ, instead of σ, multiplications).
Specifically, in that protocol, C injects an additional random
element in the inputs on which S is asked to computed the
value of the exponentiation function Fexp, so to satisfy the
following properties: (a) if S returns correct computations of
Fexp, then C can use these random values to correctly compute
y; (b) if S returns incorrect computations of Fexp, then S
either does not meet some deterministic verification equation
or can only meet C’s probabilistic verification equation for
at most one possible value of the random elements; (c) C’s
messages hide the values of the random element as well as
C’s input to the function. By choosing a large enough domain
(i.e., {1, . . . , 2λ}) from which this random value is chosen, the
protocol achieves a very small security probability (i.e., 2−λ).
As this domain is much smaller than the group, this results in
a considerable efficiency gain on C’s running time.
In the design of our protocol proving Theorem 1, we first
of all attempt to adapt the delegation protocol for fixed-base
exponentiation over cyclic groups in [15] to a delegation proto-
col for fixed-exponent exponentiation over an RSA group. The
conversion from a delegation protocol for fixed-base exponen-
tiation to one for fixed-exponent exponentiation is somewhat
standard, and is performed by notation changes. However, after
that, we note that the analysis of the probabilistic verification
test in [15] makes two assumptions that are not true or not
known to be true in our group: (1) there exists an efficient
protocol for the client to verify that a value sent by the
server actually belongs to the group; and (2) the group is
cyclic. Specifically, (1) is unknown to be true (note that, for
instance, verifying whether a value is coprime with n requires
computing a GCD which is not significantly more efficient
than an exponentiation in Z∗n); and (2) is not true since Z
∗
n is
not cyclic when n is the product of two primes.
To deal with (1), in our protocol the client can efficiently
test whether values sent by the server are in Zn, and then we
show that if the server sends values in Zn\Z
∗
n the probabilistic
test either cannot be satisfied or can only be satisfied for at
most one value of C’s random element.
To deal with (2), we further study the analysis in [15] of
the probabilistic test and observe that it can be adapted to
hold with respect to values in a non-cyclic subgroup of Z∗n, as
long as elements of this subgroup have high (i.e., greater than
2λ) order. Although the textbook choice of n as the product
of two large, same-length, primes may not always satisfy this
condition, we observe that a very common choice of n in
cryptographic applications satisfies a very similar condition.
Specifically, by choosing n as the product of two safe primes,
the group Z∗n only contains elements of either order (much)
higher than 2λ, or of rather low order. Furthermore, the latter
case can be efficiently tested by C using a single multiplication
(i.e., testing whether the group element is a non-trivial root of
1). In the case C’s input is a value of low order, to preserve
the protocol’s correctness, C efficiently calculates the function
feExpn,e by himself and halts the protocol.
C. Formal description of our protocol
Input to C and S:
1) parameters 1σ and 1λ
2) desc(feExpn,e), including n, e
Private input to C: x ∈ Z∗n
Offline phase instructions:
1) Randomly choose ui ∈ Z
∗
n, for i = 0, 1
Set v0 = u
−e
0 mod n, v1 = u
e
1 mod n and store
(ui, vi) on C, for i = 0, 1
Online phase instructions:
1) C randomly chooses b ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ}
C sets z0 := x · u0 mod n, z1 := x
b · u1 mod n
C sends z0, z1 to S
2) For i = 0, 1
S computes wi := z
e
i mod n
S sends wi to C
3) if x2 = 1 mod n
C returns y = x and the protocol halts
C computes y := w0 · v0 mod n
if wi 6∈ Zn for some i ∈ {0, 1} then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
If w1 6= y
b · v1 mod n (the ‘probabilistic test’) then
C returns ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns y
D. Proof of properties of our protocol
The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspection:
• With respect to round complexity, the online phase of
the protocol only requires one round, consisting of one
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message from C to S, followed by one message from S
to C.
• With respect to communication complexity, the online
phase of the protocol requires the transfer of 2 elements
in Z∗n from S to C and 2 elements in Z
∗
n from C to S.
• The offline runtime complexity consists of 2 fixed-
exponent exponentiations with a random base. S’s run-
time complexity consists of 2 fixed-exponent exponen-
tiations. C’s runtime complexity consists of 5 multi-
plications and 2 exponentiations to a random exponent
≤ 2λ. In the typical setting λ = 128, and using the
the square-and-multiply algorithm for multiplication, C
only performs at most 517 (or an average of 389) group
multiplications in Z∗n.
The correctness property is demonstrated by observing that if
C and S follow the protocol then the following holds:
• if x2 = 1 then C returns y = x. Note that
– if the power of x is an even number (say, 2a) in Zn,
then x2a = (x2)a = 1a = 1 mod n
– if the power of x is an odd number (say, 2a+ 1) in
Zn, then x
2a+1 = x2a · x = x mod n
Since gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, we know that e is an odd positive
integer which implies that y = feExpn,e(x) = x
e = x
mod n.
• Otherwise, C performs 2 more verifications and outputs
y such that y = xe. Both verifications always pass as
follows:
– the test checking membership of w0, w1 to Zn is
always passed since wi is computed by S as z
e
i
mod n, for some zi ∈ Z
∗
n and all i = 0, 1 and thus
wi ∈ Z
∗
n ⊆ Zn for all i = 0, 1
– the probabilistic test is always passed since w1 =
ze1 = (x
b · u1)
e = (xe)b · ue1 = y
b · v1 mod n
Thus, C never returns ⊥, but does return y. To see that
y is the correct output, note that
y = w0 · v0 = z
e
0 · u
−e
0 = (x · u0)
e · u−e0 = x
e mod n.
The privacy property of the protocol against a malicious S
follows by observing that C’s message to S does not leak any
information about x. This message is a pair (z0, z1) where
z0 = (x · u0) mod n, z1 = x
b · u1 mod n. Note that as u0
and u1 are uniformly and independently distributed in Z
∗
n, so
are z0 and z1. For the same reason, it satisfies the following
two properties:
1) for any x, z0 and z1 are uniformly and independently
distributed in Z∗n;
2) the distribution of b, conditioned on x, z0 and z1, is
uniform over {1, . . . , 2λ}.
We will use both facts in the proof of the security property.
To prove the security property against a malicious S we need
to compute an upper bound ǫs on the security probability that
S convinces C to output a y such that y 6= feExpn,e(x). If
x2 = 1 mod n, C does not use any information from S; in
other words, C calculates feExpn,e(x) = x
e without using w0,
w1 sent by S. Thus, ǫs = 0 in this case. Now, assume that
x2 6= 1 mod n. We obtain that ǫs = 2
−λ+ ǫ, as consequence
of the following 4 claims:
1) for all i = 0, 1 if wi /∈ Zn then C always outputs ⊥
2) If exactly one between w0 and w1 is in Zn\Z
∗
n, then C
outputs ⊥ after running the probabilistic test;
3) if w0, w1 ∈ Zn\Z
∗
n or w0, w1 ∈ Z
∗
n, then C does
not output ⊥ after running the probabilistic step with
probability at most 2−λ;
4) if all of C’s verifications in the protocol are satisfied,
then, except with probability 2−λ it holds that y = xe
mod n.
Claim 1 directly follows by inspection of C’s instructions.
To prove Claim 2, we consider two cases, depending on
which among w0 and w1 is in Zn\Z
∗
n. First assume w1 ∈
Zn\Z
∗
n and w0 ∈ Z
∗
n. In this case both y and y
b · v1 mod n
are in Z∗n and the probabilistic test cannot be satisfied as it
tests equality between two values in different subsets of Zn.
Now, assume w0 ∈ Zn\Z
∗
n and w1 ∈ Z
∗
n. In this case, we can
write, without loss of generality, w0 = p1w
′
0, for some integer
w0 < p2, and, by setting t as the quotient of the division y
b/n
over the integers, we can further write the value yb, for any
integer b, as
yb = (w0v0)
b = (p1w
′
0v0)
b = pb1(w
′
0v0)
b − tn mod n
= p1(p
b−1
1 (w
′
0v0)
b − tp2) mod n,
where the quantity (pb−11 (w0v0)
b− tq) is strictly less than p2.
This implies the following fact (also useful later):
Fact 3.D.1. For any y ∈ Zn \ Z
∗
n and integer b > 0, it holds
that yb mod n ∈ Zn \ Z
∗
n
Then we have that both y and yb mod n belong to Zn \ Z
∗
n
and thus the probabilistic test is not satisfied as it tests equality
between two values in different subsets of Zn.
To prove Claim 3, we start by defining the following events
with respect to a random execution of (C, S) where C uses x
as input:
• ey, 6=, defined as ‘C outputs y such that y 6= feExpn,e(x)’
• e⊥, defined as ‘C outputs ⊥’
By inspection of (C, S), we directly obtain the following fact.
Fact 3.D.2. If event ey, 6= happens then event (¬ e⊥) happens.
With respect to a random execution of (C, S) where C uses
x as input, we now define the following events:
• e1,b, defined as ‘∃ exactly one b such that S’s message
(w0, w1) satisfies w1 = (w0 · v0)
b · v1 mod n’
• e>1,b, defined as ‘∃ more than one b such that S’s
message (w0, w1) satisfies w1 = (w0 · v0)
b · v1 mod n’.
By definition, events e1,b, e>1,b are each other’s complement
event.
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In our proof of the privacy property of (C, S), we proved
that for any x, C’s message (z0, z1) does not leak any
information about b. This implies that all values in {1, . . . , 2λ}
are still equally likely even when conditioning over message
(z0, z1). Then, if event e1,b is true, the probability that S’s
message (w0, w1) satisfies the probabilistic test, is 1 divided
by the number 2λ of values of b that are still equally likely
even when conditioning over message (z0, z1). We obtain the
following
Fact 3.D.3. Prob [¬ e⊥|e1,b ] ≤ 1/2
λ
We now show that if S is malicious then it cannot produce in
step 2 of the protocol values w0, w1 ∈ Zn \ Z
∗
n or values
w0, w1 ∈ Z
∗
n satisfying both of C’s verifications for two
distinct values b1, b2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
λ}. To prove this statement
we assume, towards contradiction, that there exist two such
values b1 and b2 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2
λ}, and, without loss of
generality, assume that b1 > b2. Then b1−b2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
λ−1}
and we have that
w1 = y
b1 · v1 mod n and w1 = y
b2 · v1 mod n
yb1 · v1 = y
b2 · v1 mod n
yb1−b2 = 1 mod n.
We divide the rest of the proof into two cases, depending on
which set both of w0, w1 belong to.
Case (a): w0, w1 ∈ Zn \ Z
∗
n. In this case, recall that y =
w0 ·v0 mod n, and since v0 ∈ Z
∗
n, we have that y ∈ Zn \Z
∗
n.
Moreover, since b1−b2 > 0, by applying again Fact 3.D.1, we
obtain that yb1−b2 is also in Zn \Z
∗
n, and thus cannot ever be
equal to 1, which implies that the equality yb1−b2 = 1 mod n
cannot hold, which is the desired contradiction.
Case (b): w0, w1 ∈ Z
∗
n. In this case, since y = w0 ·v0 mod n
and v0 ∈ Z
∗
n, we have that y ∈ Z
∗
n. Recall that by Fact 2.1 the
elements of Z∗n can only have order equal to 1 or 2, or greater
than or equal to min(p′1, p
′
2). Since C checks that y
2 6= 1, then
y cannot have order 1 or 2, and thus must have order at least
min(p′1, p
′
2). Since by definition of b1, b2 we know that 0 <
b1 − b2 < min{p
′
1, p
′
2}, we have that the equality y
b1−b2 = 1
mod n cannot hold, which is the desired contradiction.
We obtain the following fact.
Fact 3.D.4. Prob [ e>1,b ] = 0
The rest of the proof of Claim 3 consists of computing an
upper bound ǫs on the probability of event ey, 6=. We have the
following
Pr(ey, 6=) ≤ Pr(¬ e⊥)
= Pr(e1,b) · Pr(¬ e⊥|e1,b)
+Pr(e>1,b) · Pr((¬ e⊥|e>1,b)
= Pr(e1,b) · Pr(¬ e⊥|e1,b)
≤ Pr(e1,b) ·
1
2λ
≤
1
2λ
,
where the first inequality follows from Fact 3.D.2, the first
equality follows from the definition of events e1,b, e>1,b and
the conditioning rule, the second equality follows from Fact
3.D.4, and the second inequality follows from Fact 3.D.3. We
then obtain that ǫs = 2
−λ, and the claim 3 follows.
Claim 4 follows by protocol inspection and combining
claims 1-3, which concludes the proof of the security property
for (C, S).
E. A generalization of our protocol
We considered the natural question of which groups does
our protocol (C, S) in Section III-C generalize to. We believe
our protocol generalizes to groups (Z∗n, ·), where all elements
of Z∗n satisfy one of these two properties:
1) have order larger than 2λ, for a statistical security
parameter λ; and
2) are efficiently detectable to have much smaller order
(say, a small constant independent of λ, σ).
Note that for these generalized Z∗n groups, the first test in step
3 of the protocol (currently checking whether x2 = 1 mod n)
is updated into a test to detect whether C’s input has low order
(which exists from above property 2), and the analysis related
to the probabilistic test in step 3 is still satisfied (thanks to
the above property 1). Examples of integers n for such groups
include products of a constant number of safe primes of the
same length, products of two safe primes of different lengths
> λ, and products of two same-length primes p1, p2 such that
each factor of product (p1−1)(p2−1) is either a small power
of 2 or > 2λ.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we describe parametric (as a function of
parameters σ, λ) and numeric performance evaluations of our
protocol in Section III. We also compare our protocol with the
non-delegated computation of the same function.
So far we have expressed the performance of our protocol
in terms of group multiplications and two parameter functions:
texp(ℓ), the number of multiplications in Z
∗
n to compute one
exponentiation to an arbitrary ℓ-bit exponent; and tinv(ℓ), the
number of multiplications in Z∗n to compute one inversion to
an arbitrary ℓ-bit value. A more concrete evaluation of the
performance of our protocol requires a (possibly optimized)
instantiation of these two functions. As there can be different
algorithms for the computation of exponentiation or inversion
for arbitrary ℓ-bit value, we optimize for the following two
representative settings for texp:
1) Basic setting for exponentiation runtime: using the text-
book square-and-multiply algorithm to evaluate group
exponentiation we can set
• texp(ℓ) = 2ℓ
2) Improved setting for exponentiation runtime: using the
closed-form estimate for the number of multiplications
in Brauer’s 1939 exponentiation algorithm, as described
in [5], we can set
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TABLE I
PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR PROTOCOL (C, S), IN TERMS OF NUMBER
OF MULTIPLICATIONS, FOR GENERAL σ, λ
Metric
Basic or
Improved
feExp
(no delegation)
feExp
(with delegation)
tF
B 2σ 2σ
I σ(1 + 1
log σ
) σ(1 + 1
log σ
)
tP
B 0 4σ + 3
I 0 2σ(1 + 1
log σ
) + 3
tC
B 2σ 4λ+ 5
I σ(1 + 1
log σ
) 2λ(1 + 1
log λ
) + 5
tS
B 0 4σ
I 0 2σ(1 + 1
log σ
)
ǫp B & I 0 0
ǫs B & I 0 2−λ + ǫ
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR PROTOCOL (C, S), IN TERMS OF NUMBER
OF MULTIPLICATIONS, FOR σ = 2048 AND λ = 128
Metric
Basic or
Improved
feExp
(no delegation)
feExp
(with delegation)
tF
B 4096 4096
I 2235 2235
tP
B 0 4099
I 0 4472
tC
B 4096 517
I 2235 152
tS
B 0 4096
I 0 4469
• texp(ℓ) = ℓ(1 +
1
log ℓ
).
We also refer the reader to [6], [7], [14], [26] for other
algorithms claiming runtime improvements, although
note that these papers do not provide additional closed-
form evaluations.
In order to evaluate group inversion of ℓ-bits (i.e. tinv(ℓ)), we
can also use the protocol for delegation of inversion described
in [9], where the computationally weak device only needs to
calculate 3 ℓ-bits multiplications.
Tables I and II compare the performance of our delegation
protocol in Section III with a non-delegated computation of
the client under both basic (B) and improved (I) settings for
functions texp, tinv where in Table I, we give the formula in
general case for parameters σ and λ and in Table II we plug the
values for σ = 2048 and λ = 128. The Table I and II reports
expressions (as a function of σ, λ, for efficiency metrics tF (the
number of multiplications to compute function feExp), tP (the
number of multiplications used in the protocol’s offline phase),
tC (the number of multiplications by C in the protocol’s
online phase), tS (the number of multiplications by S in the
protocol’s online phase), ǫp (the probability parameter in the
privacy definition), and ǫs (the probability parameter in the
security definition).
The main takeaway from the tables is that by comparing
non delegated protocols with our protocol, we see that our
protocol in Section III reduces tC by a multiplicative factor
of about σ/λ with respect to non-delegated computation when
using both basic and improved settings
V. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the problem of a computationally weaker
client delegating group exponentiation to a single, possibly
malicious, server, originally left open in [24], in some class
of RSA-type groups. We solved this problem by showing
a protocol that provably satisfy formal correctness, privacy,
security and efficiency requirements, in the class of groups Z∗n,
where n is the product of two safe primes. In the presented
protocol, the probability that a cheating server convinces the
client of an incorrect computation result can be proved to be
exponentially small.
Our techniques imply that expensive operations in RSA-based
cryptographic protocols (specifically, encryption with a large
exponent) can be delegated to a cloud server, with considerable
savings on client computation.
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APPENDIX
A. The delegation protocol from [15]
An efficiently verifiable membership protocol for group G is
a one-message protocol, denoted as the pair (mProve,mVerify)
of algorithms, satisfying
• completeness: for any w ∈ G, mVerify(w,mProve(w))=1;
• soundness: for any w 6∈ G, and any mProve′,
mVerify(w,mProve′(w))=0;
• efficient verifiability: the number of multiplications
tmVerify(σ) in G executed by mVerify is o(texp);
• efficient provability: the number of multiplications
tmProve(σ) in G executed by mProve is not significantly
larger than texp.
In [15] it is shown that (Z∗p, · mod p), for a large prime p,
and (Gq, · mod p), for large primes p, q such that p = 2q+1,
where Gq is the q-order subgroup of Z
∗
p, are groups used
in cryptography with an efficiently verifiable membership
protocol.
Let (G, ∗) be a cyclic group with efficient operation, and let
(mProve, mVerify) denote its efficiently verifiable membership
protocol. The delegation protocol for the fixed-base exponen-
tiation function fbExpg,q in cyclic group G with generator g
and order q was formally defined in [15] as follows.
Input to S: 1σ, 1λ, desc(fbExpg,q)
Input to C: 1σ, 1λ, desc(fbExpg,q), x ∈ Zq
Offline phase instructions:
1) Randomly choose ui ∈ Zq , for i = 0, 1
2) Set vi = g
ui and store (ui, vi) on C, for i = 0, 1
Online phase instructions:
1) C randomly chooses b ∈ {1, . . . , 2λ}
C sets z0 := (x−u0) mod q, z1 := (b·x+u1) mod q
C sends z0, z1 to S
2) S computes wi := g
zi and πi :=mProve(wi), for i =
0, 1
S sends w0, w1, π0, π1 to C
3) If x = 0
C returns: y = 1 and the protocol halts
if mVerify(wi, πi) = 0 for some i ∈ {0, 1}, then
C returns: ⊥ and the protocol halts
C computes y := w0 ∗ v0
C checks that
y 6= 1, also called the ‘distinctness test’
w1 = y
b ∗ v1, also called the ‘probabilistic test’
mVerify(w0, π0) = mVerify(w1, π1) = 1,
also called the ‘membership test’
if any one of these tests is not satisfied then
C returns: ⊥ and the protocol halts
C returns: y
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